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At the beginning of the 21st century, national state identities are openly questioned and 
have become problematic. While being corroded by the forces of globalization they are 
also subject to fragmentation, competition and overlapping elements of a multiple and 
diverse nature. In parallel, there is a noticeable strengthening of sub- and supra-state 
identities. The revival of ethnoterritorial identities has coincided with an increasing 
challenge to the centralist model of the unitary state. In plural polities, decentralisation, 
federalisation and subsidiarity seek to accommodate an institutional response to the 
stimuli of their internal diversity. They often comprise groups and countries with 
differences of identity, history, language or traditions, which are reflected in different 
party systems, channels of elites’ representation or interests’ articulation. The cases of 
Catalonia and Scotland are paradigmatic in this respect.  
 
In the subsequent sections, the notion of ‘dual identity’ is reviewed in relation to 
decentralization in Britain and Spain regarding the Scottish and Catalan cases. A brief 
account of the use of the so-called ‘Moreno question’ in Scotland twenty years ago 
serves the purpose of putting into perspective the merits and limitations of this 
methodological tool. A second part of this article deals with the process of 
Europeanization and how the ‘Moreno question’ may be relevant to improve our 
knowledge about multiple identities within the European Union. References to sub-sate 
cosmopolitan localism and the supra-state Europe’s social model are aimed at 
discussing new lines of research. These would focus on identity formation and the 
conciliation of citizens’ attachments to the various institutional layers of governance in 
Europe.  
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DUAL IDENTITY AND HOME RULE 
 
The concept of dual identity or compound nationality concerns the way in which 
citizens identify themselves in sub-state minority nations or regions. It incorporates in 
variable proportions the ethnoterritorial (regional) identity and the state (national) 
identity.1 As a result of this, citizens share their institutional loyalties at both levels of 
political legitimacy without any apparent fracture between them.  
 
As regards multinational democracies and compound states, citizens have striven during 
the long period of peace after the Second World War to make compatible both 
ethnoterritorial/regional and state/national identities. The quest for self-government and 
home-rule by regions and sub-state communities is in full accordance with the variable 
manifestation of such duality in citizens’ self-identification: the more the pre-Union 
ethnoterritorial identity prevails upon modern state identity, the higher the demands for 
political autonomy. Conversely, the more characterised the state national identity is, the 
less likely it would be for ethnoterritorial conflicts to appear. In some instances, positive 
perceptions by the citizens of the actions of state actors may have resulted in a 
‘loosening’ of their ethnoterritorial identity and a corresponding reinforcement of their 
sense of membership within the compound state, and vice versa.  
 
At the extreme, complete absence of one of the two elements of dual identity would lead to 
a socio-political fracture in the pluri-ethnic polity. In such an event, demands for self-
government would probably take the form of secessionist independence or forced 
assimilation would seek to impose homogeneity and acculturation. In other words, when 
citizens in a sub-state community identify themselves in an exclusive manner, the 
institutional outcome of such antagonism will also tend to be exclusive. 
 
The degree of internal consent and dissent in plural polities has in the concept of dual 
identity a useful methodological tool for socio-political interpretations. The 
manifestation of such a compound nationality in many EU member states has translated 
into the establishment of sub-state or regional legislatures and mesogovernments. These 
are to be regarded not only as institutions of reference for ethnoterritorial identities, but 
also as yardsticks in the political aspirations of sub-state communities (German Länder, 
Italian Regioni, Spanish Comunidades Autónomas or the UK’s devolved 
administrations). The role of these self-governing institutions in the production and re-
production of, for example, Basque, Catalan, Scottish or Welsh identities has been very 
important (Keating 2001; Loughlin et al. 2001; Martínez-Herrera 2002).  
 
In parallel, it is also observable that there is a strengthening of popular attachments to 
supra-state frameworks such as that of the European Union. As a result of all these 
developments, citizens in European democracies seem to conciliate sub-state, state and 
supra-state identities, which ‘sovereignist’ majority and minority nationalisms often 
tend to polarise in a conflictive manner. The emphasis on territorial identities and polities 
showing a significant degree of internal diversity ought not to be placed merely on 
                                                 
1 The terminology for describing both spatial identity levels (regional and state/national) lacks of 
conceptual accuracy in some instances. Ethnoterritorial is meant to deal with the category of stateless or 
minority nations and regions within plural unions and compound nation states. Other expressions, such as 
sub-state and state identities, are also used despite the fact that they imply a somewhat hierarchical 
understanding of the phenomena under analysis (Moreno and McEwen 2005). 
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distinctiveness, but also on those relationships of democracy, interaction and congruence 
(Linz 1997; Gagnon and Tully 2001; Moreno 2005). 
THE SCOTTISH AND CATALAN CASES  
 
In 1983 I came to Edinburgh and engaged in comparative research on home rule 
between Scotland and Catalonia as the theme of my PhD dissertation (1986).2 Already 
by this time, some academic attention had been given to citizens’ self-identification in 
Spain. Juan José Linz’s influential work on Spain’s early state formation and late 
peripheral nationalisms (1973) provided a conceptual base for the scaling of 5 
categories of self-identification.3 As he had insightfully observed: 
 
Spain [today] is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the 
Spanish population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities’ 
(Linz 1975, p. 423). 
 
After Franco’s death in 1975, other Spanish social scientists had also been making 
valuable contributions on the issue of national/regional identities (Jiménez Blanco et al. 
1977; García Ferrando 1982; López-Aranguren 1983). And while living outside Spain – 
as was also the case with Linz – Salvador Giner had carried out revealing analyses of 
the phenomena of ethnic nationalism and the centre-periphery dichotomy in Spain 
(Giner 1984).4
 
The articulation of the territorial form of the new democratic state in Spain was a very 
delicate political issue. There was general agreement among the democratic parties and 
social actors that decentralization of power was essential. However, the specific 
territorial model to be adopted was unclear. In the end, a broad inter-party consensus 
made possible the adoption in the 1978 Constitution of the federalizing Estado de las 
Autonomías. The Spanish 1978 Constitution was approved in a popular referendum by 
87.9% ‘yes’ votes, 7.8% ‘no’ votes, and 4.3% null or blank votes (32.9% of the 
registered electoral abstained from voting). It did not include the word ‘federal’ in any 
of its provisions. None of the subsequent constitutional legislation has made reference 
to federal arrangements in strictu sensu. However, since the beginning of the 1980s the 
dynamics of the Estado de las Autonomías (‘State of Autonomies’) are characterized by 
a latent federalization. The process of home-rule-all-round has aimed at providing internal 
territorial accommodation by combining both federal principles of self-rule and, to a lesser 
degree, shared rule (Moreno 2001). 
 
Against this background I had actively participated as an elected regional councillor in 
the quest for autonomy for the Madrid region within the general process of Spanish 
devolution after 1978. The first democratic local and provincial elections in Spain after 
                                                 
2 I wrote my thesis at the Department of Politics in the University of Edinburgh. My viva voce took place 
in September 1986. Board members were Salvador Giner (external examiner), David McCrone (internal 
examiner) and Henry Drucker (thesis supervisor).  
3 Linz and his collaborators at DATA first began to use these categories in public opinions surveys carried 
out in 1979 (Linz et al. 1981: 519-548). He also incorporated those identity groupings in his 
comprehensive study on the Basque Country (Linz et al. 1986)  
4 He had written an insightful monograph on the social structure of Catalonia (Giner 1980). Later on I had 
the privilege of co-authoring with him a publication on the ethnic dimension of the Spanish society (Giner 
and Moreno 1990). 
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the long Franco dictatorship were held in 1979. Concerning my academic interests, 
however, I always felt that the appropriate commensurability in the comparative 
research I was about to carry out in Edinburgh was between Scotland and Catalonia.5 I 
was fortunate to have Henry Mathew Drucker as my PhD supervisor. 
 
Henry Drucker (1942-2002) was a pioneer of the studies on Scottish devolution. In 
1976, he, with others, created the Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland at 
Edinburgh University – the first such unit in Scotland. He co-edited the first six editions 
of The Scottish Government Yearbook – a chronicle of policy and politics. Both 
under different names (Institute of Governance and Scottish Affairs) survive to this 
day. He co-authored with Gordon Brown (British Chancellor of Exchequer at the time 
of writing this article) the book The Politics of Devolution and Nationalism (1980), 
published in the aftermath of the 1979 Referendum on Scottish Devolution put forward 
by the Callaghan Labour Government. Henry Drucker wrote extensively about the 
Labour Party (1978, 1979) and initiated as general editor the successful university 
textbook, Developments of British Politics (Drucker et al. 1983).6 In the latter years of 
his life, he took his enthusiasm for academia in a different direction. Between 1988 and 
1994 he directed Campaign for Oxford, which raised some £340m for the University. 
Thereafter, he ran his own consultancy advising charities, universities and arts 
organisations on raising money for their good causes. His achievements have survived 
him through the countless people he encouraged, strengthened and inspired. 
 
Henry Drucker introduced me to the works of John P. Mackintosh (1962, 1968, 1970), 
whose writings on Scotland and on devolution he had edited.7 I was struck by 
Mackintosh’s powerful insights into the issue of Scottish devolution, which he 
vigorously promoted. And I intuitively discovered a commonality – among the various 
affinities and dissimilarities8 of the Scottish and Catalan cases – reflected in the ‘dual 
identity’ or ‘compound nationality’ that both Scots and Catalans seemed to share. I felt 
the issue was highly relevant to my research and I decided to give it further theoretical 
and empirical grounding.  
THE ‘MORENO QUESTION’ 
 
For Scotland, the normative implications of my research had already been put forward 
by Mackintosh, who emphasized the dual or compound nationality of the Scots:  
 
For over 200 years there has been a Scottish tradition fostered by the law, 
education, separate Church and local government, but the Scots … [are] … also 
                                                 
5 At that time it was somewhat uncommon that a madrileño as myself would be interested in studying 
Catalonia, given the secular ‘rivalry’ between the two territories in Spain. I am grateful to my friends and 
fishing pals Jordi Gràcia and Manuel de Guirior - two Catalan ‘expatriates’ in Madrid during the Franco 
years in the early 1970s – who taught me not only the use of the Catalan language, but also helped me to 
‘understand’ and to love Catalunya. 
6 The seventh edition, published in 2003, is dedicated to him. 
7 As Drucker put it: ‘John Mackintosh (1929-1978) stood in a venerable Scottish tradition of radical 
intellectual publicists and activists. At the end of his life he was Professor of Politics at Edinburgh 
University, a Labour MP and a columnist for The Scotsman. The subject Mackintosh professed in the 
University, in Parliament and in Scotland was democracy.’ (Drucker 1982, p. 1).  
8 On he main economic, political and social similarities and differences between the Scottish and Catalan 
cases, see Moreno (1986, pp. 2-9; 1988, pp. 166-173). 
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British and have taken pride in British traditions. It [is] quite wrong to attempt to 
make the Scots deny half of their dual nationality (Drucker 1982, p. 141). 
 
Thus, the institutional idea behind the implementation of devolution in Scotland was to 
establish a ‘dual parliament’ (Edinburgh and London) in order to reflect the dual level 
of legitimacy provided by Scots’ self-identification. 
 
In the Scottish case, I wanted in 1986 to corroborate what I already knew about 
Catalonia.9 But in Scotland, surveys with a similar scale had never been carried out to 
my knowledge. So how was I to get the data? I was a PhD student who was already 
close to the end of his third and final year of research in Edinburgh. I could scarcely go 
out and interview a large and representative sample of Scots. By one of those quirks of 
life, Henry Drucker was not only an academic, but also a frequent commentator in the 
press and on television and well connected. He came up with the idea of asking the 
Glasgow Herald newspaper to add a question to one of the polls of political opinion 
that it regularly commissioned. As he put it in his letter to the polling organisation 
System Three Scotland: 
It occurs to me that with the very high results you (and MORI) are getting about 
devolution and independence it would be very interesting to know if the strong tide 
has had any impact on how people see themselves. There has never been a decent 
Scottish poll on this subject. We don’t know if people think of themselves as 
Scots/British/both or even English... 
With his gifted managerial capability, Henry Drucker was able to ‘find’ £200 plus VAT 
[£230] for System Three to include the ‘Moreno question’ in its survey (a sample of 965 
adults aged 18 and over were interviewed in-home in 39 sampling points throughout 
Scotland over the period 26 June/1 July 1986). Respondents were shown a prompt card 
listing 5 alternatives: ‘We are interested to know how people living in Scotland see 
themselves in terms of their nationality. Which of the statements on this card best 
describes how you regard yourself?’ The wording of the ‘Moreno question’ has been 
slightly modified in different subsequent surveys,10 but the central idea has always been 
geared towards the selection by the respondents of one of five main categories. In the 
cases of Catalonia/Scotland these are as follows: 
 
1. Catalan/Scottish, not Spanish/British 
2. More Catalan/Scottish than Spanish/British 
3. Equally Catalan/Scottish and Spanish/British 
4. More Spanish/British than Catalan/Scottish 
5. Spanish/British, not Catalan/Scottish. 
 
The figures for the sixth category of ‘Don’t know/No answer’ are usually very low as 
compared to the usual percentages produced in this kind of survey. This finding seems 
to confirm that citizens are not indifferent to the cultural exercise of self-identification. 
However, and under special circumstances, higher ‘Don’t know’ percentages can be 
                                                 
9 ECO-Estudios Comerciales y de Opinión, S.A had carried a survey over the period 13/15 March 1985 
with a sample of 1,316 adults (margin of error: ±2.8 with certainty of 95.5%). The results were 
reproduced in the magazine, Cambio 16 and confirmed a degree of ‘dual identity’ of about 80% of the 
Catalan population expressed in a previous survey of 1984 (Moreno 1986, p. 68). 
10 Others wordings have been ‘In general, would you say that you feel...’, or ‘In which of these five 
categories you include yourself…’. 
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significant. In the Basque Country, for instance, the climate of political violence and 
terrorism has had an obvious impact in this category. Note that during the period 
October 1990-June 1995, 6 per cent of Basques’ responses were under this category 
(Moreno 2001, p. 116). 
 
In mid July 1986 we received the results from System Three. The main figures were as 
follows: 
 
1. Scottish, not British: 39% 
2. More Scottish than British: 30% 
3. Equally Scottish and British: 19% 
4. More British than Scottish: 4% 
5. British, not Scottish: 6% 
 Don’t know/No answer: 2% 
 
The figures showed a degree of ‘duality’ in the way a majority of Scots (53%) identified 
themselves. The proportion was, however, much lower than the 80% in the Catalan 
polls. There was data room for other interesting interpretations. As David McCrone has 
accurately reiterated in subsequent and detailed studies,11 ‘regional identity’ (category 1 
and 2) was significantly higher (69%) in Scotland as compared with that in Catalonia 
(34%). By contrast, English people might have had more difficulties in differentiating 
English and British identities, a feature reflected also in the use of the word ‘England’ 
outside Britain when referring to the United Kingdom.12 But Scots had traditionally 
been more aware of the status of Scotland as a union nation member of the British state 
and of identifying their ‘compound nationality’ in dualistic terms (Scottish and British). 
During the 1990s, results in survey polls on the ‘Moreno question’ indicated that 
‘regional identity’ (59% in 1992) was much lower. Nevertheless, and based on the 
analysis of the third Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2001), recent surveys have 
produced figures very similar to the ones of the 1986 study (36% for category 1 and 
30% for category 2) (Bond and Rosie 2002). 
INTERPRETING SCOTTISHNESS 
 
Twenty years ago, I found it striking that this strong Scottishness seemed to combine 
with a weaker popular quest for achieving institutional self-government as compared 
with Catalans’ mobilization in the late 1970s. It seemed to me that since the Second 
World War, the Scottish political class tended to defend, in an inert manner, a political 
territorial pattern which did not exist in post-Franco Catalonia, and which had also been 
greatly influenced by the dialectics of partisan competition and self-interest 
characteristic of English-British politics. Thus, the achievement of home rule – the 
concern of a majority of Scots – had always been subordinated to the priorities of each 
                                                 
11 First as editor of the series the Scottish Government Yearbook since 1983, and later as author of the 
annual reports on ‘Opinion Polls in Scotland’ published in the journal Scottish Affairs, David McCrone 
has pioneered sociological studies on Scotland (1992), surveys on Scots’ public attitudes and research on 
national identity at a time of constitutional change in the UK after the implementation of devolution in 
Britain. 
12 In Italy, for instance, the media and the general public continue to refer to the UK as Inghilterra 
(England). This was also the case in Spain not long before the transition to democracy and the beginning 
of the process of decentralisation in the late 1970s. In Britain the ‘nationalization’ of symbols (flags or 
anthems) by the various British national sports teams (football, golf, or rugby) has contributed to a more 
accurate distinction by the public eye between Britain as a whole and its constituent nations. 
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political party. While the autonomy of Scottish civil society since 1707 was reflected in 
a strong sense of collective identity (Paterson 1994), the lack of a common inter-party 
political platform had hindered the claim for access to home rule in contemporary times 
(Moreno 1986).  
 
However, political developments in the late 1980s and 1990s (especially during the long 
tenure of the Conservative government in the UK, when Scotland was always returning 
a large and increasing majority of non-Conservative MPs) gave impetus to the claim for 
Scottish devolution. The establishment of the CSA (Campaign for a Scottish Assembly) 
brought together a widely representative body of parties and other institutions of 
Scottish civil society, which proposed the establishment of a Scottish Constitutional 
Convention (SCC). This published its plans for a Scottish Parliament on 30 November 
1990. Alongside the creation of bodies of the CSA/SCC type, another prescriptive 
conclusion in my PhD dissertation pointed to the need to hold a new referendum on 
devolution. On 11 September 1997, a sizeable majority of Scots (three out of four 
voters) not only favoured the devolutionary scheme and the setting up of a Parliament in 
Edinburgh, but also that the Scottish legislative assembly could have some tax-raising 
powers, a feature supported by a majority of nearly two out of three voters.  
 
The results of the 1986 System Three survey on Scots’ self-identification provided me 
with information concerning the variables of ‘age’, ‘gender’, ‘class’, ‘area of residence’ 
and ‘party supported’ by the respondents. A slightly higher percentage of women (22%) 
expressed an ‘equal identity’ (category 3, or ‘equally Scottish and British’) than men 
(16%), as was the case with younger responders aged 18-24 (27% as compared to 19% 
of the total sample). There were also higher numbers of those stating an ‘exclusive’ 
Scottish identity (category 1) living in the East (44%) and the North (43%), than in the 
West of Scotland (33%), as well as in the DE class variable (47%), while the well-off 
AB classes were more inclined to acknowledge the British connection (‘state identity’, 
or categories 4+5, was expressed by 18% of AB’s as compared to 10% of the total).13  
One could have expected a more robust correlation of answers according to parties’ 
support. Certainly 20% of Conservative voters stated a British ‘state identity’ 
(categories 4+5), but as many as 56% also expressed a Scottish ‘regional identity’. Yet 
the Conservative Party was at this time very hostile to devolution and to independence 
(Mitchell 1990). More surprising was the fact that less than half of the surveyed people 
(45%) expressing support for the Scottish National Party (SNP) stated a Scottish 
‘exclusive identity’ (category 1). It was then assumed that SNP sympathisers would be 
in favour of independence and, consequently, would express a strong preference for a 
single Scottish identity.  
 
These findings showed no little complexity. They have been further interpreted in the 
post-Devolution era in contrast with data provided by other studies correlating identity 
with two other indicators of strong Scottishness: (1) support for the SNP, and (2) 
support for an independent Scotland (Brown et al. 1998; Bond 2000; Curtice et al 2002; 
Paterson et al. 2001). In post-Devolution Scotland, a large minority of SNP supporters 
(around 40%) have expressed no support for independence while around a quarter of 
                                                 
13 AB class corresponds to professional, managers and white-collar workers, whereas DE class include 
semi- and un-skilled manual workers. In general, the ABC1s fall under the heading ‘middle classes’, 
whereas the remainder C2DEs are grouped as ‘working classes’. 
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Labour voters have been in favour of independence in recent years (Bond and Rosie 
2002). 14  
 
The political significance of the manner in which Scots identify themselves appears to 
be more complex than assumed beforehand. Other than acknowledging the high level of 
legitimacy in the setting up of Scottish democratic institutions within the framework of 
the British state, Scottish ‘dual identity’ and a strong sense of Scottishness cut across 
other functional dimensions of social life, such as gender, class or religion, with 
variable political effects.  
 
In general, the task of measuring and relating the notion of dual identity/compound 
nationality to other political phenomena, such as constitutional preferences or 
institutional performances, is far from simple. The growing importance of other levels 
of supra-state membership – such as the one brought about by the process of 
Europeanization – is also having deep impacts in the conciliation and interplay of the 
various citizens’ identities and their political implications. The emergence of a new EU 
framework of supra-state governance and an inter-state and intra-state political 
convergence are processes well under way. As a political framework, the European 
Union is a compound of policy processes, and Europeanization implies that national, 
regional and local policies are to be shaped by considerations beyond the mere 
centrality of the member states.  
 
What can we learn from the findings of the ‘Moreno question’ regarding sub-state and 
state forms of self-identification when dealing with supra-state institutions? How 
multiple identities of a territorial nature interact politically in the process of 
Europeanization? As a general proposition, it could be claimed that in order to ensure 
political legitimacy for the setting up of the EU’s democratic institutions, people should 
identify themselves as European to some degree. This statement follows the 
argumentative rationale put forward by the ‘Moreno question’ regarding the quest for 
the devolution of powers from the state level to that of the minority nations and regions 
at sub-state level within a compound polity.  
 
However, several considerations are to be taken into account and further explored by 
future research. If it is true that instances of cosmopolitan localism are increasingly 
noticeable in Europe, and thus a growing conciliation of the ‘general’ and the 
‘particular’, such phenomena do not exclude the possibility of contradiction between 
exclusive forms of self-identification within EU member states, and between the latter 
themselves. A central issue to investigate further is whether European citizenship15 can 
be preserved as a common tenet of the various EU political views and whether Europe’s 
social model is to consolidate a distinctive European identity. In the sections that follow 
a discussion on these issues is carried out with the aim of identifying prospective lines 
of study and analysis. 
                                                 
14 In Catalonia a ‘dual tactical voting’ involving the two main electoral forces (nationalist CiU and 
socialist PSC) could be deduced by analysing the electoral results in the period 1977-1996. A relatively 
small but significant sector of electors expressing a degree of ‘dual identity’ seemed to have voted 
differently according to the nature of the election (local/municipal, Catalan Parliament, or Spanish 
Parliament) (Moreno and Arriba 1996; Moreno, Arriba and Serrano 1998).  
15 Article 8 of the Treaty of Maastricht establishes citizenship of the European Union as follows: ‘Every 
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’. 
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EUROPEAN COSMOPOLITAN LOCALISM AND EXCLUSIVE IDENTITIES 
 
Indeed, the supra-state framework provided by the European Union has reinforced sub-
state identities. Decentralisation has become a major embedding factor in contemporary 
political life in Europe. The quest of stateless nations and sub-state regions to run their 
own affairs and to develop their potentialities outside the dirigiste control of central 
state institutions is an observable phenomenon in the ‘Old Continent’. The 
reinforcement of sub-state territorial identities is deeply associated with powerful 
material and symbolic referents of the past. However, their manifestations do not take 
refuge in a reactive parochialism. They emerge, therefore, as ‘project identities’ 
characterised in many instances by pro-active attitudes.16 Thus, territorial identities in 
the EU are mainly pro-active.17
 
The processes of bottom-up supra-nationalisation and top-down decentralisation have 
allowed a considerable extension of a type of European cosmopolitan localism (Moreno 
1999). This is reflected in societal interests which are aimed at both developing a sense 
of local community and at participating simultaneously in the international context. 
There is, thus, a growing adjustment between the particular and the general. 
 
European cosmopolitan localism mainly concerns medium-sized polities, within or 
outwith the framework of a state. In Europe it can be detected in nation states (Denmark 
or Finland), stateless nations (Catalonia or Scotland), regions (Brussels or Veneto) and 
metropolitan areas (London or Berlin), which are well equipped to carry out their own 
innovative policies in a more integrated Europe. The latter, in particular, seem to follow 
a pattern of re-creating those political communities which flourished in the age prior to 
the New World discoveries (Italian city-states, Hanseatic League, principalities). 
However, and in contrast with the Renaissance period, there is now a common 
institutional tie inherent to the process of Europeanization. EU peoples have internalised 
European institutions, albeit rather loosely and gradually. The European Court of Justice 
and the Schengen Agreement, as well as common policy-making represented by the 
Euro currency, the Maastricht macro-economic criteria or programmes put forward by 
means of the OMC (Open Method of Co-ordination) can be regarded as steps advancing 
firmly towards the very idea of supra-state Europeanization.18 In parallel, the principle 
of subsidiarity provides for decisions to be taken at EU level only if local, regional or 
state democratic institutions cannot perform better. In other words, the preferred locus 
for decision-making is that it be as close to the citizen and as local as possible. State 
political elites, reluctant to further the process of European institutionalisation, have 
often interpreted the subsidiarity principle as a safeguard for the preservation of 
traditional national sovereignty and, consequently, the powers to intervene centrally. 
                                                 
16 According to Manuel Castells (1997) ‘project identities’ do not seem to originate from the old identities 
of the civil societies in the Industrial Age, but from the development of current ‘resistance identities’ 
against the informational avalanche. This argument is rather circular as regards its territorial dimension. 
In the case of the USA sub-state spatial identities are not commensurable with the type of collective 
identities deeply rooted in the Volkgeist of the diverse European peoples.  
17 Other functional identities linked to various dimensions of social life, such as cultural forms, gender, 
religion and individual sociobiological conditions can also be interpreted as new forms of ‘resistance’ 
(Kilminster 1997). 
18 However, the constitution of a United States of Europe is not the necessary outcome of the process of 
Europeanisation. The neo-functionalist school of thought has generally adopted the view that universal 
progress requires integration, which is made equal to cultural assimilation and single identity formation, 
along the lines of the American ‘melting-pot’ (Moreno and Palier 2005). 
 9
In this process of Europeanization, how may sub-state identities interact within the same 
polity? What are the political and institutional implications concerning the conflicting 
identities involved in citizens’ identity compound? Is it possible that two sub-state 
identities can be integrated in a larger-than-the-state entity maintaining a possible 
relationship of incompatibility? Could the exclusive forms of self-identification in the 
cases of, for example, Basque-Spanish, Corsican-French, Flemish-Belgian, Padanian-
Italian or Scottish-British be consistent with a common European identification? These 
questions cannot be simply dismissed as part of a political oxymoron. A common 
answer to the various contingent cases and manifestations of such identity dichotomies 
can only be speculative as comparative evidence is still lacking. To be underlined is the 
fact that multiple identities are contextually negotiated and are in a process of constant 
adaptation to changing political scenarios induced in many cases by political parties for 
reasons of expediency and ‘pork barrel’ politics.  
 
For example, not all nationalist parties took a stance against the draft European 
Constitution completed in 2004, as could be the case in Spain of the Catalan Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya or the Basque Eusko Alkartasuna. The latter has been in the 
Basque Government in coalition with - and was originally created as a splinter party 
from – the hegemonic Partido Nacionalista Vasco, which actively supported the project 
of European Constitution in the Basque Country, as well as did the main nationalist 
coalition Convergència i Unió in Catalonia. At the beginning of 2005, Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats were in favour of the European constitutional text in Scotland. The 
SNP, generally favourable towards the EU, was supportive of an EU Constitution in 
principle, but their opposition to it in practice was bound up with their ‘contingent’ 
hostility to the Common Fisheries Policy. Conservatives, main advocates of Britain 
joining the EEC in 1973, were hostile to the EU Constitution in Scotland as in the rest 
of the UK. 
 
A crucial element to be further analysed is whether disengagement from one territorial 
identity should correspond to a situation of growing attachment to other dimensions of 
identity. It has been argued that English/British identities can be conceptualised in 
opposition to, and to the exclusion of, the European Union (Schlesinger 1997). In 
Scotland the European identity – and a more positive attitude to the process of 
Europeanization – has been underlined in contrast to that ‘south of the border’. It has 
also been argued that a backlash of the type of essentialist state nationalism, which is 
against the ‘dilution’ of state national features into the ‘melting pot’ of a bureaucratised 
EU, should not be discounted. Some authors hold the view that the potential for a 
pessimistic scenario is just around the corner. The ever-latent possibility of rivalries 
between the nation-states, trade conflicts between world regions, or the growth of 
religious fundamentalism and xenophobia are potentially explosive (Chomsky 1994). 
Much attention is to be placed on expectancies of co-operative behaviour that would 
also stem from identity. As stated earlier, conventional wisdom puts forward the 
assumption that a shared EU identity and citizens’ internalisation of being European 
ought to be consolidated in order to legitimise European institutions, incumbent 
authorities, and policies. However, more research is needed to examine the two-way 
relationship between European identity and its institutional outcome. The preservation 
of a distinctive European identity resource providing the basis for a common citizenship 
is crucial in this respect. 
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EUROPE’S SOCIAL MODEL 
 
The gradual obsolescence of the hierarchical and ‘command-and-control’ model of the 
welfare state may have modified its capacity to generate social solidarity across national 
boundaries, undermining the extent to which those citizens with a dual national identity 
continued to identify with and give consent to both state and sub-state dimensions of 
political membership (McEwen 2002). But beyond a state-centric view, welfare 
arrangements may also optimize their goals by means of consolidating policies at all 
three levels of public life: sub-state, state and supra-state level.  
 
Despite the diversity of its institutional forms and manifestations (Anglo-Saxon, 
Continental, Eastern, Mediterranean and Nordic welfare regimes), the European social 
model can be identified as one based upon collective solidarity and as the result of 
patterns of social conflict and co-operation in contemporary times. There is a widespread 
belief that the European social model provides collective unity and identity to most EU 
countries, in contrast to other systems, especially the United States social model, where 
individualization is a distinctive tenet for welfare provision. The articulation of ‘floors’ or 
‘nets’ of legal rights and material resources for citizens to participate actively in society 
can be seen as a common primary concern in all European member states. However, can 
the European social model be expected to enhance a European identity among citizens?  
Further analyses dealing with data on public support and opposition to the European 
Union are needed. In general, future research could focus on the evaluation of the 
effects of the EU on citizens’ identity. Hypotheses to be considered would be whether 
(a) citizens concerned with the reduction of their national welfare systems and 
perceiving European homogenisation as a cause of such a reduction should be less 
supportive of Europe, and (b) citizens perceiving European integration as preserving 
and developing the European social model ought to be more supportive of Europe. 
Along the same lines, studies could deal with the assessment of the effect of 
identification with the EU and support for or opposition to European integration on 
attitudes to redistributive policies, public health systems or public education systems.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the last twenty years a considerable number of studies have focused on the political 
accommodation of stateless nations in advanced democracies. Prior to the events in the 
1970s, which led to some authors to theorise about the ‘break-up’ of multinational states 
(Nairn 1977), identity and territorial politics had received comparatively less attention 
than the functional analyses of plural developed societies.19. Most research endeavours 
up until the 1980s concentrated in the study of class-orientated conflicts, conflicts 
among interest groups, or corporatist institutional arrangements, to name but a few of 
the then most common areas of study.  
 
In the mid-1980s, a survey poll was carried out with a five-category scale concerning 
dual self-identification by the Scots (the so-called ‘Moreno question’). The main idea 
behind the utilization of such a scale was to find empirical evidence for the claims to 
                                                 
19 Indeed, Stein Rokkan was a precursor and a pioneer in underlying the relevance of the spatial 
dimension of politics in his ambitious project to systematize ‘the model of Europe’ (Flora et al. 1999). 
Many of the conceptual expressions used by Rokkan have subsequently become coined terms of 
generalized use within the international academy of social sciences (boundary building, centre-periphery, 
or cleavage structures).  
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legitimise the setting-up of democratic political institutions in Scotland. Sub-state 
regional legislatures and governments were established during the 1980s in Spain and, 
in the late 1990s, in the UK. Such processes of decentralisation of powers have not only 
preserved meso-level identities but have also projected the political aspirations of these 
sub-state communities, which have given priority to cultural, educational, linguistic, and 
media policies. Home rule mesogovernments in Britain and Spain have been very active 
in promoting the production and re-production of their own territorial identities. 
However, they have done so deploying a cosmopolitan localism view that combines a 
promotion of local interests with an active participation in the international context. 
Much like the assumption implicit in the ‘Moreno question’ as regards institutional 
implications at sub-state and state levels, it could also be claimed that a degree of being 
European in citizens’ self-identification is necessary to legitimise the setting-up of the 
EU’s democratic institutions. Arguably, Europe’s social model can be singled out as the 
one providing the main identity resource in the process of Europeanization, one which 
nevertheless dislikes centralization and standardization.  
 
The development of a European supra-state welfare system is unlikely in the near 
future. In promoting welfare development, state and sub-state identities will continue to 
play a crucial role in peoples’ expectations, perceptions and values. This area of social 
policy-making is highly shaped by local cultures and lifestyles, and is less likely to be 
dealt with in a homogenous manner from a supra-state entity. Rather, Europeanization 
should be regarded as a process of multi-level governance incorporating existing 
cultural systems and collective identities at both state and sub-state levels. In this way, it 
would avoid being realized as an exogenous process superimposed externally. The 
conciliation of the various identity layers and citizens’ political expectations will be a 
determining factor for the building of a European ‘community of trust’.20  
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